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ABSTRACT
While there are many working scientists who engage in things like theory
building and empirical testing, there has also been a group of scientists who sought to
better understand the philosophy behind science. This philosophical study of science as a
project is referred to as the philosophy of science and there are different sub-fields for
each of the natural and social sciences, except for political science. This lack of an
explicit sub-field dedicated to reflecting on our philosophy of science, i.e., our beliefs,
values, methods, etc., has caused this knowledge to become tacit within our community.
Because the knowledge of our philosophy of science is now tacit, we as a community are
hindered in our capacity to engage in critical self-reflection which is an important part of
any scientific endeavor. However, what has been is not what need be moving forward, we
can still turn this tacit knowledge into formal knowledge which will then allow us to
grow as a community. This thesis will demonstrate a few of the ways in which our
knowledge of the philosophy of our science has become tacit, and why this is indeed a
bad thing. The specific topic areas addressed are the misunderstandings of the natural
sciences in our community, the process of categorization, and our goals as a scientific
tradition. This is in service of the true goal of this thesis project, which is to give a proper
augment for the creation of the philosophy of political science as an explicit sub-field.
Keywords: Social Science, Political Science, Methodology
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Science, as an enterprise, is highly chaotic because it covers such a wide range of
materials, from black holes to amoebas. Though this doesn’t mean that the individual
sciences are any less hectic, as any practicing scientist, in any field will tell you, each
field is comprised of sub-fields that have their own approaches, beliefs, etc. While this
atmosphere of chaos is pretty much baked into every science, there may be times when it
can become a bit much for the scientists, and this is where the philosophy of science
comes in. In general, the philosophies of science and social science seek to examine
broad concepts of science such as, what is a science or social science, is the knowledge
produced by science better than other types of knowledge, etc. However, there are also
various sub-fields of philosophy of science, each existing to examine what I refer to as
the foundational paradigm of a specific science. Foundational paradigms are similar in
some respects to the notion of a paradigm as it is used in our contemporary society. The
contemporary view of a paradigm is that it is specific methods, beliefs, and standards of a
science. A foundational paradigm on the other hand examines some of the deeper parts of
a scientific enterprise by examining things like value beliefs, metaphysical
presuppositions, and so on. However, a foundation paradigm is also a term that can
encompass the contemporary view of what a paradigm is, as such moving forward, I will
utilize my term of foundational paradigm.
There are explicit sub-fields of philosophy of science for every major branch of
the natural and the social sciences except for political science. Now, this doesn't mean
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that there isn't work being done in political science that might be classified as being a
contribution to the philosophy of political science, nor does it mean that there isn't some
kind of informal field of philosophy of political science. However, what it does mean is
that there is no explicit field of study, there are no journals, no symposiums, no
conferences, in short, there is no institutional acceptance of this field. Why does this
matter? While an informal philosophy of political science is good, as something is better
than nothing, without it having formal recognition it means that current work is often
mislabeled and incorrectly assessed. Also, the lack of institutional recognition of the
importance of this type of research can stop us as a scientific community from engaging
in an important level of self-reflection as well as stop us from engaging in important
debates. This lack of critical self-reflection has caused many in our scientific community
to simply engage in practices without fully understanding why they do what they do, how
these practices work, and why they are supposed to work.
It is because of this that I argue that what political studies needs right now is a
new sub-field that can be simply called the philosophy of political science. The
philosophy of political science could be described as simply the philosophical study of
what practicing political scientists do, why they do it, and how. This sub-field would help
us gain a much more thorough understanding of the foundational paradigm behind
political science as well as open a space for us to engage in discussions and debates that
we are unable to as of now. In the following sections, I will examine three specific topic
areas, the first of which is the misunderstandings of the natural sciences held by political
science. In this section, I will demonstrate that our current foundational paradigm was
built around a view of the natural sciences and their foundational paradigms that is
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incorrect in many ways and that we ought to engage more critically with what we take
from the natural sciences. The second topic I will discuss are practices of categorization
and classification. Here I will discuss what these practices are and why we utilize them,
before offering an alternative approach. The final topic is the goals of our scientific
tradition, and it is here that I will show our current foundational paradigm is one of
problem and puzzle-solving. From here I will establish some of the issues with these
traditions before offering a potential alternative option. I believe that these topics and the
discussions had about each of them will be able to demonstrate that our current
foundational paradigm is not inherently perfect and that there are problems with it. But
more importantly, I believe that each discussion will show that a new sub-field will have
a lot of work to do and that there are plenty of debates to be had about our foundational
paradigm. The three topics picked are just some of the many potential avenues for
exploration. However, first I will start by looking at what little work has been done in the
discussion of whether we ought to establish the explicit sub-field of philosophy of
political science.
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CHAPTER TWO: LTERATURE REVIEW
Putting together a literature review on the idea of establishing the explicit subfield of philosophy of political science is a bit difficult. This is due to there being
currently being no explicit sub-field, thus, the term philosophy of political science is
never really used. Now, this isn't to say that there has been no work on discussions that
could be classified as being philosophy of political science, but that the work is done in
an informal manner because there is no institutional recognition. Though it is worth
noting that any work done which might be seen as being a part of the philosophy of
political science, often gets lost in a sea of political philosophy and political theory. The
reason being is that these sub-fields are where we have relegated nearly all philosophical
discussions about our domain and science. However, political theory and political
philosophy end up covering a much wider range of topics than the philosophy of political
science would as a discipline. An example of how these three are different can be seen by
looking at the general topic of democracy. While political philosophy may ask questions
about what a democracy is and political theory might ask about the institutions
comprising a democracy, a philosophy of political science might ask about why we
classify states as democracies the way we do. Without having a separate field of research
any work done is forced to find a home in a place that it doesn’t fit into very well which
can degrade the content and make it hard to find, which is one of the major reasons we
need an explicit sub-field. That being said there is actually some research that can be
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brought up, these works are Bruno Verbeek and Lee McIntyre (2017), and Pozzani
(2021).
The work from Bruno Verbeek and Lee McIntyre that we will be examining is
their contribution to the Routledge Companion to the philosophy of Social Science
(2017). This work of Verbeek and McIntyre seeks to understand not only why the subfield of the philosophy of political science is currently non-existent, but also why it is
important to establish it. At the start of their contribution, Verbeek and McIntyre examine
the question of why the philosophy of political science doesn't exist. Though in their
discussion they quickly realize that this isn’t the right question to be asking because, as I
mentioned in the introduction, there is indeed work being done that we can classify as
being philosophy of political science, it just isn’t explicitly called that. Verbeek and
McIntyre claim that most of this work is currently done under the labels of political
theory or political philosophy and as such it can get be a bit hard to find. This leads them
to argue the same thing that I do in the previous paragraph, that there is a big difference
between political theory, political philosophy, and the philosophy of political science.
From here they then go on to examine a couple of areas that they feel can offer a bit of
evidence for their claims.
One of the biggest pieces of connective tissue that exists between this article and
my own ideas comes down to our agreement that an explicit sub-field is necessary.
Verbeek and McIntyre, argue we ought to build this explicit sub-field to help bring the
current work together under a proper banner. This will also help to bring more interest to
the topic and help the field grow. Their argument ends up pulling from the history of the
philosophy of chemistry in which they are able to demonstrate that the situation faced by
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contemporary political science is similar to the situation faced by chemistry in the 90s.
For a very long-time chemistry didn’t have its own explicit sub-field to study its
foundational paradigm and thus there was only a very small group of chemists who were
engaged in the enterprise. However, in 1997 this changed drastically as not only did the
field explode onto the scene, but it also brought with it a huge wave of interest in the
topic. This resulted in the creation of journals, conferences, symposiums, and much more
which then gave further rise to new opportunities for researchers. Thus, just as there were
very clear institutional benefits gained from the establishment of the philosophy of
chemistry, these same benefits could very likely be seen if we were to establish a
philosophy of political science.
The final piece of literature that I will be examining here is an article by Gianluca
Pozzoni which is in many ways a response to Verbeek and McIntyre (2017). In this
article Pozzoni (2021) sets out to offer their own account for why there is no philosophy
of political science. While Verbeek and McIntyre argue that a philosophy of political
science exists, Pozzoni believes that we don’t really have a cohesive philosophy of
political science because there is no clear line of demarcation between what is and isn’t
political science. By looking at the history of political science Pozzoni is able to show
that our discipline has changed quite a bit over the years which makes it nigh impossible
to create a temporally stable definition of political science. Since there can’t be a stable
definition of political science, Pozzoni argues there also can’t be a proper and stable
definition of the philosophy of political science. They end their article by advocating
against the establishment of an explicit sub-field of philosophy of political science and
argue that we ought to just unify the philosophy of the social sciences.
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The main part of Pozzoni’s work that I think is important for my project is his
conclusion section. Specifically, I want to address his final argument that we ought to
create a unified philosophy of social science instead of a bunch of sub-fields. This means
we shouldn’t establish the explicit sub-field of philosophy of political science. There are
two main areas of disagreement here between Pozzoni and me, the first is that he argues
for a unified view of social science while I do not. Pozzoni’s argument is rooted in his
belief that a non-unified science serves mostly a pragmatic purpose, which they argue is
not a good enough reason for its usage, though I would argue the opposite, it is Pozzoni’s
view that is the more pragmatic one. This is because it is a lot easier to simply talk about
an abstract term like 'social science' that doesn't have a direct reference for its definition,
that is to say, we can't define social science without referring to the social sciences.
Pozzoni’s view of science ignores the complex reality of what working scientists do and
thus I would argue that his view is unable to philosophically interrogate the individual
sciences the way he thinks it can. While the social sciences may study similar things, the
way each one goes about examining their domain is different and thus deserves its own
attention.
This then leads us to the second area of disagreement between Pozzoni and me,
which is in our epistemological beliefs. Pozzoni holds a view that social knowledge, and
knowledge in general, ought to be representative of the ‘real world’, which is why he
thinks we ought to establish a unified philosophy of social science because the social
world is chaotic and unable to be compartmentalized. However, this view is quite
different from my own, which can be referred to as an absurdist view. Absurdism is a
metaphysical belief system that recognizes that any system of beliefs falls victim to one
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of two paradoxes. We can state that all models are invalid, which then logically causes
problems because even this model becomes invalid. The other claim we can make is that
only our model is correct, which then causes us to have to agree or disagree with a whole
host of potentials. Thus, any attempt to build a system of beliefs that won't fall victim to
these paradoxes is an exercise in futility. This is something that absurdism recognizes,
there is no one answer to the question of metaphysics, and this can be extrapolated
outwards to the realm of ontology. My specific ontological view is that true knowledge,
knowledge that is irrefutable to the individual, can only come from one's own immediate
experience. I know that trees exist because I touch them, I know my cat is real because I
pet him, I do not know if purgatory exists though because I have never been nor even
know what a purgatory would look like. Because of this, any kind of knowledge that is
forced to move beyond my own experience ends up as constructed knowledge. I would
argue that the concept of whether science can be viewed in a unitary fashion or not is one
such piece of constructed knowledge. I know through experience that the entire world is
highly complex, and this complexity means that any attempt to understand it either by
looking only at its individual parts or the whole, is pointless. The world is a continuous
mixture of individual parts which comprise the whole, however, one cannot view the
whole without looking at the parts. This is as true for the world as it is for science. It is
because of this that I would argue that if Pozzoni wishes for the social sciences to build
knowledge that is reflective of ‘the world’, as in the physical world devoid of human
experience, they ought to be calling from the roofs for each social science to have its own
philosophy of science.
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Overall, I find there to be a lot of agreement between myself and Verbeek and McIntyre,
especially their points about the benefits that can come from the creation of a new subfield, though the same isn’t true for myself and Pozzoni. I also found the specific topic
areas that they each investigated to be interesting. I would argue that the topics covered
by Verbeek and McIntyre, while not discussed here, are important for they demonstrate
some more of the potential for this new sub-field. Not only could this new sub-field be
able to examine the topics covered in this project, which are more foundational topics,
but also very specific ones such as the topics brought up by Verbeek and McIntyre.
However, I do not believe that the topics discussed by Pozzoni are as relevant to this
project due to their being mostly historical discussions about our science, which are still
relevant for a philosophy of political science sub-field, but not this project. The biggest
thing that Verbeek and McIntyre and Pozzoni are able to demonstrate is that there is a
debate going on, though it is a quiet one.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE NEED FOR AN EXPLICIT SUB-FIELD
To start this section off I want to offer my own input to a question posed in the
literature review, is there a philosophy of political science? I would argue that the answer
is yes, just like Verbeek and McIntyre, political science does have an informal field that
has done some work on examining the paradigms of political science. However, the work
that has been done has yet to properly examine our overarching foundational paradigm. I
argue that our foundational paradigm was built upon a model of the natural sciences
which existed during a time when its foundational paradigm was taken for granted due to
the continuous success it achieved. 1 This resulted in the political science community
adopting a model of the foundational paradigms of the natural sciences that saw selfreflection as being unnecessary due to the level of success achieved. This continues today
as political science doesn’t truly engage in a critical discussion of its own foundational
paradigm. The reason for this is that the knowledge of our foundational paradigm is tacit
and not formal.
Tacit knowledge is a type of knowledge that was first named by Michael Polanyi,
and it is defined as a type of knowledge people have but that cannot necessarily be
codified or expressed (Polanyi 1966). A good example of this kind of knowledge is the
knowledge one obtains from cooking, one cannot explain the exact reason for why they

See the sub-section, misunderstanding the natural sciences and the philosophy of science, for more
information.

1
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do what they do in the kitchen, they simply act on their own insights. The opposite of
tacit knowledge for Polanyi is formal knowledge which is knowledge that can be written,
expressed, and easily transmitted. An example of formal knowledge is knowing the
Capital of Italy is Rome. While this view is good, I would also like to make a bit of a
change to Polanyi’s definition of tacit knowledge. The reason I want to make this change
is that I would argue that practicing political scientists know the foundational paradigm
which drives their work, but this knowledge is tacit, just not in Polanyi’s sense. Many
political scientists can explain what the foundational paradigm requires them to do, but
not why it requires this. This means that the knowledge held by the practitioners of
political science is neither truly tacit nor formal but instead a mixture of both. This is also
the case with the person who knows the Earth is not flat but not why. This shows that
creating a clear line of demarcation between tacit and formal knowledge, such as the
ability for the knowledge to be codified, isn’t enough because people must also know
why they know it.
Due to the knowledge of our foundational paradigm being mostly tacit in nature,
we often end up missing, either passively or actively, a lot of the issues with our ideas.
Yet this does not mean that issues do not exist, nor that there are no benefits to be derived
from pointing them out, for it is only once we recognize that a problem exists that we can
begin to work towards a solution. As such this paper will look at three different topics
that I feel show some of the foundational work that can be done by an explicit philosophy
of political science sub-field. This is not to say that this sub-field must examine issues
such as these, as the discussions brought up by Verbeek and McIntyre are just as valid
and important, but it is to say that there is a wide range of potential topics to be covered.
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These discussions will also show that our current views and perspectives are not perfect,
they must be examined critically, which is something that is best done by an explicit subfield.
Each of the topic areas that have been picked serves an important purpose in this
paper. The first topic examines some of the potential issues with our current
understanding of the natural sciences and the philosophy of science, the second examines
the way we view and engage in classification and categorization, and the final topic looks
at the goals of our science. I have chosen these three because each one is present in our
current foundational paradigm. There are no students majoring in political science today
that will be able to get a degree without at least hearing these ideas in one or more of
their classes. Beyond that, each of these topics is directly impacted by our current tacit
foundational paradigm and the challenges I will raise will show why we need to create a
space for these critical discussions where different views can be raised, and norms
challenged. This is a space that can only be created by an explicit sub-field of philosophy
of political science.
Misunderstanding the Natural Sciences and Their Foundational Paradigms
We as a scientific community hold various misunderstandings about the natural
sciences and foundational paradigms of natural science. Now, this isn't any one person's
fault, it is a larger societal issue that also impacts all of the social sciences. However,
since our foundational paradigm is based on a view of the natural sciences and the
philosophy of the natural sciences, we must be sure that we understand them. To help
demonstrate the claim that we have based much of our foundational paradigm on the
natural sciences, let us quickly examine our history as a science. The history of political
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science shares a lot with the history of the other social sciences, especially in the main
thinkers who helped to establish the basis of our contemporary foundational paradigm.
These thinkers include people like Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber.
One important aspect that ties these thinkers together is their view of positivism.
Positivism is a philosophy of science that stresses the importance of empiricism and
argues for the removal of metaphysics within science. Positivism, in the social sciences,
was built around the goal of trying to make the social sciences more ‘scientific’ by
mirroring the natural sciences. However, positivism wasn’t simply accepted by the entire
scientific community and there were debates over things like its epistemological beliefs.
One of the groups that took the side of positivism ended up branching out and starting a
new philosophy of science called logical positivism. Logical positivism was simply the
logical evolution of positivism that sought to, in a sense, upgrade the doctrine to account
for the newest discoveries in science. However, while this school of thought has
essentially died out in the philosophy of science, it has continued to have major
influences in our field.
While our foundational paradigm is indeed based on a view of the foundational
paradigms of the natural sciences, what is rather odd is the way we have failed to
understand the natural sciences and the philosophy of the natural sciences. Not only that
but there has also been a lack of critical reflection on these ideas within political science.
A good example of these mistakes can be seen in Francis Fukuyama’s book The End of
History and the Last Man (1992). This book has been widely discussed and criticized
within our community, yet there has not been a single review that looked at his views of
the natural sciences. This is odd because these views play a large part in his work and as
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such help guide his overall argument. I would argue that the reason these views were not
discussed is because they were very similar to the ones held by the rest of the community
and because Fukuyama hit the right buzzwords, his views went largely ignored. This
section will offer a quick and unique review of Fukuyama’s work and demonstrate many
of these misunderstandings. From there I will then go on to show that some of the views
held by Fukuyama can be seen in our community now. These discussions will serve the
larger goal of demonstrating that there are many more things that we ought to investigate
within our foundational paradigm which we took from the natural sciences and that an
explicit sub-field is the path I believe will serve us best.
Reviewing Fukuyama’s, The End of History
There are many different criticisms and reviews that exist for Fukuyama’s book,
yet there are none that examine the claims he makes about science. While there are
reviews of his usage of Hegel and history there are none that examined this key
component to his line of thinking.2 I would argue that the reason that little to no work has
been done on discussing Fukuyama’s misunderstandings is that for the political scientists
reading his book, these ideas of science were also ones they held. This ties back into the
notion that the current philosophy of political science is tacitly accepted by the members
of the community. If this is indeed the case, then it is extremely important that we
properly analyze Fukuyama’s work.
If I were to summarize Fukuyama’s view of science I would do so with one word,
scientistic. Scientism is a world view that holds that the methods, beliefs, and knowledge

The only real piece of criticism one can find about this is done by Fukuyama himself in another one of his
books, Our Posthuman Future (2002). In this second book, Fukuyama retracts the claim that history has
ended because for this to happen modern science and technology would also have to come to an end.

2
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of the natural sciences are inherently superior to other systems of knowledge that are
outside natural science. It also argues that the methods used in the natural sciences are the
best ones for use in other areas of science, thus other sciences must engage in quantitative
and inductive reasoning. There are many different areas of his work that we could point
to give evidence for this claim, though one of the best examples comes from the
introduction of his book in which he states,
Modern natural science is a useful starting point because it
is the only important social activity that by common
consensus is both cumulative and directional, even if its
ultimate impact on human happiness is ambiguous. The
progressive conquest of nature made possible with the
development of the scientific method in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries has proceeded according to certain
definite rules laid down not by man, but by nature and
nature’s laws. (Fukuyama 1992)
This quote shows that Fukuyama has a clear belief that the natural sciences stand
in a unique position when compared to other human activities such as astrology. We can
also see from this statement that Fukuyama harbors a reductive materialist view as well.
Reductive materialism is a view of the world in which everything is reducible to physical
processes. An example of this is the idea that human actions can be understood only if we
reduce the phenomena down to things like biochemistry. An example of Fukuyama’s
materialist view is his ontological beliefs, that being, his views of knowledge, specifically
scientific knowledge. Fukuyama argues that the results of science are not impacted by the
individual scientists, they are perfect reflections of ‘the word’, which is the notion of a
world devoid of human perception. 3 Yet I would ask, is there actually support for his

3

Further on in this section I discuss his views in more detail and offer up evidence for this claim.
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scientistic view or is it more akin to any other metaphysical belief? 4 While we could
simply restate many of the post-modernist claims here to show the issues with his views,
I believe that there is a different path available to us. As such, in order to answer this
question, we will need to dissect Fukuyama’s views in a bit more detail and go over them
one by one. I have chosen to discuss three topics regarding his scientistic attitude. They
are scientific progress, scientific method, and scientific knowledge. I have chosen each of
these topics because they are fundamental to his overall view, and thus, if they falter, so
does the rest.
Let us begin this assessment of Fukuyama's scientistic attitude by examining the
arguments and discussions he has regarding scientific progress. Upon examination, we
see that his ideas are a bit of a mishmash of views, most of which are highly uncritical. A
good example is his view of historical determinism and its tying to science. Historical
determinism is the notion that there is a predetermined set of historical outcomes and that
they will play out in a rigid and mechanical way. This can be seen when he argues that
science didn't progress by chance, nor could it have come from anywhere other than
Europeans in the time it did. This argument is simply not good for a few reasons, one, it
asserts a truth that is forever unknowable. One cannot know for sure if science had to
progress the way it did, for I would argue that Buddhist cultures would have been as
likely as Europeans to discover relativity had Einstein not done so, due to their beliefs
about time which differ greatly from western European views. Another reason why this
argument is not good can be seen through the work of Thomas Kuhn and his most famous

This question is not designed to demonize metaphysics but to show that his views are but one more
metaphysical view in a see of alternatives. This is because if we can find no real empirical evidence for his
claim then it must resort to using metaphysical claims to justify itself.

4
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work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2012). Kuhn argues that science progresses
in a revolutionary manner, this happens when the current normal science is, in a sense,
overthrown. Normal science, for Kuhn, is the work done by most working scientists who
are working around a shared paradigm. Over time a revolution can occur which will
upend the entire paradigm and force the scientific community to undergo a sort of
revolution in which a new science is produced. This process is not completely
cumulative, because while the normal science is able to produce cumulative progress, the
revolution ends up destroying this progress and forces a change to something new.
Now that we have gone over the issues with his historical, determinist views let us
examine his specific claim in more detail, that scientific progress is a cumulative and
directional affair. Fukuyama argues that science advances through an accumulation of
scientific knowledge, all of it is useful for science and thus is thrown into a pile of
knowledge to be used by various scientists. However, when we add the idea of there
being a directional aspect to this progress, we see that, while all scientific knowledge is
useful, it is really only the more current information that is most pertinent. This is due to
the fact that a directional science doesn't need to go backward at all, thus older
information can be helpful, but we shouldn't utilize it too much or else we might end up
going backward. There are a couple of different issues with this view, one of which is this
view doesn't work well when we look at the history of science. Einstein's revelation about
physics was not made possible because he was forced to work within Newtonian physics,
it was the opposite. Einstein was forced into utilizing a model of physics that was preNewton.
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Having now gone over Fukuyama’s views about scientific progress, let us now
turn our heads towards examining his view of the scientific method. Fukuyama argues
that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries philosophers such as Descartes and Bacon
had discovered the scientific method, which then gives rise to modern natural science. It
should be noted here that Fukuyama’s language shows a clear connection between his
view of historical determinism and the idea of the scientific method. For Fukuyama, this
method is how science operates now and it is how science and rationality shall progress
going forward. Yet even if we push aside the already stated metaphysical issues that
come from his deterministic beliefs, we still run into other issues. The claim that a
scientific method exists and that it came about in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
is one that ignores the continuing evolution of the concept itself from the sixteenth and
seventieth centuries to today. While individuals like Descartes and Bacon had started the
discussion of this method, its current form doesn’t just come from them, it was a
culmination of work done by individuals such as Karl Popper, philosophies of science
such as logical positivism, and scientific institutions such as the Vienna circle who took
these original ideas, modified them, and added to them. Another issue is that the very
notion of there being a scientific method is non-empirical, for it asserts things like a view
of science as a unified body, claims that are once again metaphysical because there is no
way to prove this claim objectively correct or false. The final issue with this idea is that
for a scientific method to exist it must assert very subjective claims that make the method
nothing more than a representation of what the individual providing said method believes
is most important in science. I say this is because the contemporary scientific method is a
reduction of the methods of the various sciences. This method was built through a
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process of finding what few similarities existed in the various fields and sub-fields of the
natural sciences. These similarities are what supposedly connect all of the sciences
together. However, there are many problems with this, one being that the line of
demarcation built between what is and is not a science will have a big impact on the
similarities established. Another issue is that the attributes which are removed from the
comparison are highly subjective and thus any method arrived at is equally subjective. 5
Now that we have gone over the first two topics let us move on to the third and
final one, that being scientific knowledge. It is clear throughout his book that Fukuyama
holds the results of science in extremely high regard. Once again, we can equate a lot of
his views in this regard to his larger deterministic views. That being said I do want to
examine his materialist views and how they impact his view of scientific knowledge.
Fukuyama believes that scientific knowledge is objective and that it directly refers to ‘the
world’ we reside in, this is the general materialist view. As Fukuyama states, “The
scientific understanding of nature is neither cyclical nor random; mankind does not return
periodically to the same state of ignorance, nor are the results of modern science subject
to human caprice (Fukuyama 1992).” To state this another way, scientific knowledge is
objective because it tells us about ‘the world’, which is just the idea of a world devoid of
human experience and sense. Here I want to note that the notion that scientific knowledge
is capable of referring to ‘the world’ is an ongoing debate that has no objectively right or
wrong answer because both sides end up making metaphysical claims, i.e. claims which

It should be noted that the argument that the scientific method doesn’t exist isn’t a new one, it is one
advocated by many philosophers of science and scientists, which I bring up not to show the validity of the
overall argument, but to demonstrate that there is indeed a debate within the community, one that has
largely ignored (Feyerabend 2010)(Kuhn 2012)(Bridgman 1955).
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cannot be proven.6 The reason for this is because if we claim that our knowledge is
reflective of something out in ‘the world’ we are required to get past issues like that of
perception. As phenomenologists have pointed out, perception is a very tricky thing to
properly understand because there is a lot that happens in this process. The mind is forced
to interpret signals, and this process isn’t a cut and dry one, issues can and do arise in
perception (Merleau-Ponty 2010). A good example of this can be seen in gestalt
psychology, more specifically the rabbit and duck illusion. This illusion arises from a
picture that can be seen as containing either a rabbit or a duck, what determines what the
individual sees is how they perceive the picture. Some will only see a rabbit and others
will only see a duck yet neither view is right nor wrong. For philosophers like Kant, this
process of interpretation and its potential to go haywire makes it very difficult to make
objective claims about the ‘real world’, i.e., the world devoid of human experience and
sense. Instead, the claims that science makes are a mixture of what happens in our brains,
all the interpretations and so on, and ‘the world’ (Kant 2016).
The three topics I have discussed are far from the only issues with Fukuyama’s
work and his view of science. However, these topics do represent the point that
Fukuyama’s views are, at minimum, problematic. One reason being is that there are some
fundamental flaws with his understanding of the natural sciences and their foundational
paradigms. These views shaped a large part of his book. Yet, this begs the question, why
has there been no review of them before now? I would argue that no one spotted these

I would note that I do accept the metaphysical nature of the claim made. The statement is not made in
the hopes of appearing metaphysically neutral but to show that there is no non-metaphysical answer to
the question of whether scientific knowledge is objective or not.
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issues because political scientists, then and now, hold very similar views, and equally
problematic, views.
Reviewing the Beliefs of Contemporary Political Science
While pulling out parts of the foundational paradigm that Fukuyama uses was
easy, the same can’t be said for the rest of political science. This is due to our tacitly held
foundational paradigm which results in our entire scientific community having a
foundational paradigm but being unsure of what it is comprised of. This leads to there
being an odd combination of beliefs and ideas that are spread throughout various
textbooks. For example, while some political science textbooks go into some detail about
things like the history behind empiricism and positivism, as is done in McNabb (2004),
others do not go beyond the very idea of a scientific method, which is the case in Nau
(2017) and Clark, Golder, and Golder (2019). Despite this issue, there are certain
foundational beliefs that our community has established through a sort of common
consensus which we can look at. The specific beliefs I will be talking about touch on the
same topics that we examined within Fukuyama’s work, the progress of science, the
scientific method, and scientific knowledge.
Finding out what the contemporary field of political science holds as being the
‘correct’ answer to the question of ‘how does science progress’ is a bit hard because
while the idea is talked about quite a bit, it isn’t given the necessary attention. Often, we
get passing references to philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper and
maybe, if we are lucky, a glimpse at their views as well as their contributions. Our view
is that science advances in a cumulative fashion, not in a cumulative and directional
manner as argued by Fukuyama. To put it another way, science advances by putting all
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its results in a sort of treasure chest. Over time we will fill the chest with more and more
bits of knowledge, all of which are useful, so long as the knowledge in the chest is
established through empirical methods. This treasure chest view is one that is espoused
by McNabb (2004). In this work, McNabb argues that political scientists ultimately take
the results of their research and throw them into what McNabb calls a “storehouse of
knowledge” (McNabb 2004). This view makes a lot of sense if you believe that science
ought to engage in empirical analysis. Thus, it makes sense that this view of science
progressing in a cumulative fashion is held by most political scientists because our
current paradigm is that of empiricism.
The claim that our paradigm is one of empiricism deserves a bit more attention
and discussion. Empiricism, in this instance, refers to a philosophical concept which
holds that things are truly only knowable or even justifiable if they are able to be
experienced. We can see this all throughout our field, the biggest examples being the
dominant view of quantitative methods having a superior position to other methods, and
our usage of operationalization. When we examine our field, we see that regardless of the
methods used in a piece of research nearly every piece of institutionally accepted work
must always come back to one specific thing, empiricism. This is due to our current
foundational paradigm holding explanation as being the major goal for our theories, thus
they must resort to using empirical language and methods to make this happen (Verbeek
& McIntyre 2016). Explanation is good at telling us how something happens, how is it
that planes don’t fall to the ground, how is it that evolution works, etc. But explanations
can’t necessarily tell us why things occur, why did this plane crash, why did this animal
evolve the way it did, etc. To better understand why things happen we would have to shift
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over towards trying to understand phenomena and not explain it. An example of trying to
understand something and not just explain it can be seen in critical theory and postmodernism which seek to better understand why the world operates the way it does as
well as explain how it occurred.
Now that we have gone over the dominant view of scientific progress within our
community, let us now discuss the scientific method and its prevalence in contemporary
political science. This is a very easy concept to pick out of the literature for nearly every
introductory textbook has a section devoted to the scientific method (Clark, Golder, and
Golder 2019) (Nau 2017) (McNabb 2004). Though it should be noted that while both
Fukuyama and our community hold the scientific method in high regard, their views of
the method differ. One major difference is the recognition within our current foundational
paradigm that the method didn't just come from sixteenth and seventeenth-century
philosophers. Our contemporary view recognizes the very important work done by
groups like the logical positivists and individuals such as Karl Popper who introduced the
notion of falsification into modern science. These groups took the work done by sixteenth
and seventeenth-century philosophers and expanded their arguments and ideas. However,
while we do accept that things like falsification are important to the method, we still end
up teaching a multistep approach that fits well with Fukuyama’s view. An example of
this can be seen in Clark, Golder, and Golder (2019) in which they state that argue that
the basic features of the scientific method can be summed up in five steps, question,
theory, hypothesis, testing, evaluation. This basic method means absolutely nothing
without the necessary background information which is not truly present. Because of this,
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our view of the scientific method is able to be attacked in the same way as Fukuyama’s
belief.
Now that we have gone over the first two topics, let us move on to the final point
of discussion, our contemporary view of scientific knowledge. Just as Fukuyama had a
strong belief in the superiority of scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge,
we hold that there is a superior element to the knowledge produced in science. Though
this is not just an issue in political science and is indicative of the fact that scientific
knowledge has become a sort of cultural hegemon. Cultural hegemony is a concept
derived from the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci who argues that the
societal ruling class manipulates the culture of a society to ensure that their worldview
becomes the default cultural norm (Bullock, Trombley, and Lawrie 2000). Thus, the
privileged position of scientific knowledge is established within our culture because it has
helped to support systems of power. We could also argue that our holding of scientific
knowledge as being superior is also because of imperialism, as western powers sought to
utilize science to get rid of other cultural beliefs. Yet while most textbooks espouse this
view of scientific knowledge, others like Clark, Golder, and Golder (2019) show that we
can still have nuanced discussions of what ‘knowledge’ is. This demonstrates that we also
can’t just blame cultural hegemony or imperialism for this view of scientific knowledge.
There is a major disconnect in our community over these discussions, and it is due to our
tacit knowledge of our foundational paradigm. Since we don’t have a unified view, or
even multiple views, of the importance of ‘scientific knowledge’ in our community we
get a very fragmented discussion that misses important things. If we had an explicit sub-
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field, we could have a space available that would allow for these important discussions
and debates to occur in a way that is impossible now.
I would argue that scientific knowledge is a tricky concept because it is a moving
target just as the term science is also constantly changing over time. This is something
discussed by Foucault in many of his works in which he is able to demonstrate the
historical changes that have occurred for both of these ideas (Foucault 1994) (Foucault
2010). A good example of how both science and scientific knowledge changes, as well as
how things that were considered scientific knowledge one day can be regarded as
nonscientific the next, is phlogiston theory. Phlogiston theory is an old chemical theory
that sought to explain things like combustion, and while this theory was popular for a
time, its ideas were shown to be inaccurate, and as such the theory died and so did the
concept of phlogiston. Thus, this branch of science and scientific knowledge were taken
out of their respective categories, showing how the knowledge we hold today may not be
what we hold tomorrow.
Despite the widespread criticism of Fukuyama's work, which was well-founded,
there was never really any discussion of his views of science. As I have shown in this
section there is a good chance that this was because these views or some variation of
them were shared by the political science community. This made it so that reviewers
ended up skimming his discussion of science. Yet this resulted in a large part of his work
going uncriticized for nearly 30 years. The tacit understanding we have of our
foundational paradigm stops us from truly examining our own beliefs and can also stop
us from recognizing the mistakes of other scientists. The overall goal of this discussion
was to show not only some of the current views of our philosophy but also to demonstrate
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that we need to critically examine our views about the natural sciences and its
foundational paradigms. If we are going to constantly praise natural science and fashion
large parts of our science after them, then we must be sure that we are correct in our
views about how the natural sciences actually work.
The Problems with Categorization and Classification
The processes of categorization and classification are important aspects of not
only modern science but also modern life. Taking the varied and complex world around
us and building a set of generalized categories for different phenomena is one of the
necessary components that allow science to establish things like laws. This process also
isn't limited to science, many people will engage in it at different times throughout their
life. If one sees a bunch of cats together, they are more likely to describe the scene as just
a group of cats sitting together and not describe the unique characteristics of each cat. In
this example, we clump all the individual cats together under the category of cat. Thus,
the process of categorization feels almost normal to us since we utilize it in many
different parts of our lives. However, it is because this process feels so natural that we
must be on guard. I argue that the act of categorization and classification in political
science is done tacitly because of both its usage in the natural sciences and how natural it
feels. This means that many political scientists will utilize categories and different
classifications without fully examining the technical and philosophical reasoning behind
why they do it. This is not meant to be an insult to our community, it is simply another
byproduct of tacit knowledge. Just because a race car driver can't tell you the exact
reasoning behind why they do all of the things they do, that doesn't mean that they aren't
good. The same is true for practicing political scientists, just because we can’t always
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state the exact reasoning behind why we do what we do, doesn’t mean that our work is
invalid or not useful. But even race car drivers still interrogate their own tacit knowledge
by watching their own races and learning where their tacit knowledge has failed them.
This is something that we do not have in common with race car drivers, we don't
critically evaluate our tacit knowledge, we are much too comfortable with knowing how
to do something and not why. We must critically examine the practices of categorization
and classification because it is one that feels so natural to us and thus often gets ignored.
As such this section will start by discussing what categorization and classification are,
from there we can then examine how we utilize them in political science. Once we have
this base knowledge down, we can then offer a critique that can help show the problems
with our current approach.
The most important thing that we must acknowledge about the act of categorizing
and classifying things is that they are human acts. The world is not like a video game in
which everything is meticulously documented and written down before the players even
exist within the world, it is only once people exist that the world can begin to be taken
apart and classified. 7 I say this because individuals like Foucault have shown that
categories and classifications are contingent on the place and time that they are
established and as such, they change a lot (Foucault 1994). The example that Foucault
uses is the category of science, which he demonstrates has changed in many ways. Not
only did the category of science change, but so to did the things put into this category
change as well. Another example we could use for this argument is the category of

While it is not relevant to the discussion here, I would note that it is most likely the case that all living
things create categories and classifications. However, humans do it in a very conscious, and some might
say compulsive, manner.
7
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democracy in political science. The category of democracy has changed drastically over
just the past 200 years, which can be seen in the fact that any modern categorical
definition of democracy would exclude every country before the 21st century. This is
because our modern definition is riddled with value concepts that are important to our
contemporary community but that weren't to previous political scientists. Thus, there isn't
a single category of democracy because it isn't inherent to the world, but is imposed onto
it by us.
Now that we have touched on what categorization and classification are, let us
dive into discussing why we utilize these strategies in science. Both in our everyday life
and in science the act of classifying and categorizing things is used to help build some
semblance of meaning from the pieces of a chaotic world. 8 Without categorizing the
various phenomena and objects in the world, all we are left with is a bunch of random
and individual noise. Imagine attempting to learn more about tigers as an animal by going
out and finding and examining every single tiger, it would be simply unfeasible.
However, if we gather a sufficiently large group of tigers and examine them, we can then
pull-out features that are shared by this group which we can then extrapolate as being true
for the rest of the tiger population. Thus, we can see that one purpose served by the act of
classification and categorization is one of practicality and efficiency. Another important
purpose served by these acts is that they are the only way in which science can make
causal claims. Classification and categorization are ultimately acts of generalizing an

I would argue that regardless of one's personal view about whether the world and meaning come first or
if humans come first and then build the world and meaning, this point still stands. If the world and
meaning come first then humans are simply discovering the world as is and thus our categories and
classifications are still a way to make sense of, what appears at first, as a chaotic world. If humans come
first then our categories and classifications are built by us to help us understand the world.
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object and/or phenomenon which allows one to examine a great many cases. By
expanding the available data, one is able to utilize these generalities to understand if
changes within the group are the effect of something that is common in all of them across
space and time (Rosenburg 2018). These are the two main purposes served by
classification and categorization within science.
When it comes to political science and its usage of categorization and
classification, we can see that our community has tacitly accepted a methodological
approach that is used by the natural sciences. This approach has us trying to generalize
the specific phenomena in question into a set of categories or classifications by boiling
away all unnecessary characteristics. Returning to our tiger example we could begin to
look at what features are unique to each tiger and then take those traits out of our
assessment because they don’t matter for the classification due to the fact that they are
unique to specific tigers and not the general group of tigers. The specific pattern of each
individual piece of fur on a tiger doesn’t matter but their overall color does. This process
has worked well within the natural sciences and as such political science opted to bring it
into its tacit foundational paradigm. However, the way in which we establish different
categories and then attempt to force our domain into fitting into the generalizations often
doesn’t give us the same type of success it does in the natural sciences. Nation-states are
not like tigers, they are fundamentally different and thus, this difference ought to be
recognized. This now leads us to the main point of criticism of this practice and its
current usage.
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Ian Hacking: Interactive and Indifferent Classifications
This section is going to discuss the work of philosopher of science Ian Hacking,
more specifically his book The Social Construction of What? (2001) In this book
Hacking discusses the then-current trend in academic writing to debate the social
construction of pretty much anything. In his discussion, he ends up making some very
interesting arguments and comes to conclusions that can show the political science
community that there are other ways of categorizing and classifying our domain than the
current method espoused by our foundational paradigm. However, before we can discuss
Hacking’s ideas, we have to do a bit of background discussion on some important topics
that serve as the foundation of his work. These topics include discussing things like social
constructs and the differences between social constructs. Once this groundwork has been
laid we can then move on to the parts of Hacking's work that can help us most in political
science.
The first thing we need to discuss is the very idea of what a social construction is.
Now this discussion may make a few readers roll their eyes, as many have most likely
come across these discussions before, however, it is always helpful to build a bit of
support to ensure that everyone is on the same page. When one discusses the social
construction of something it is usually in this logical form as outlined by Hacking, “X
need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable (Hacking 2001)." In this argument,
we can replace X with nearly anything such as science, superheroes, and so on. When we
do this an issue may seem to come up, if we plug in a physical concept like people for X,
how does it work in this argument? This is where an important separation needs to be
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made between the physical thing and the idea or concept of the thing. For example, while
states are real, in that there are physical components to states such as leaders and
institutions, the idea of a ‘state’ is an intangible concept. Thus, when we discuss the
social construction of something, what is most usually being referred to is not the
physical object, if there is one, but the idea of the thing.
Now that we have gone over the basic idea of social construction, let us move on
to making a distinction between the things that are usually said to be social constructs.
This may seem like an odd thing to do, why would we want to distinguish between the
things we would classify as social constructs? The answer is that there is a big difference
between statements concerning, say, the social construction of people over the social
construction of science. These distinctions can help remind us of the differences between
the claims that are made. Hacking argues that we can split the things usually classified as
social constructs into one of three categories, “objects”, which refer to things ‘in this
world’, “ideas”, which are things like concepts and beliefs, and “elevator words”.
Elevator words, for Hacking, are words that operate in a different way than objects and
ideas. These words are not like objects, in that they don’t represent things that are ‘in’ the
world, but simply talk about them. Hacking argues that elevator words are used to try to
raise discussions to a sort of higher level. Some examples of these words are, truth, fact,
objective, and real. There are two issues with these elevator words, the first is that they
are circularly defined and the second is that they are not trans temporally stable concepts.
Because these words don’t refer to things in the world but instead talk about the world,
they fundamentally suffer from an inability to be tied to the world in any stable way.
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Hacking argues that it is one thing to say that a ‘fact’ is socially constructed, but it is
another to say that people or beliefs are socially constructed.
The final piece of the foundation that must be laid out concerns the way in which
ideas, and not objects or elevators words, exist within a ‘matrix.’ A matrix, for Hacking,
refers to the complex set of social and material contexts that impact ideas such as
institutions and norms. Ideas don't exist apart from other ideas or objects, they are given
meaning by people, institutions, etc. which means that ideas can be impacted by objects
and other ideas as well. A good example of an idea ‘existing’ within this matrix is the
concept of a citizen. In this context, we will utilize the concept of 'citizen' in a very basic
manner to simply illustrate the point made by Hacking. Citizen as an idea exists in a
complex world that interacts with governmental and non-governmental institutions and
bureaucracies, the people who are classified as either a citizen or non-citizen, newspapers
that discuss citizens, and every other part of the world that interacts with the idea of a
citizen. Thus, as we can see, ideas exist within a very large matrix of factors that
themselves exist within their own large matrix. As ideas change, they lead to interactions
within this matrix that then can inspire changes in other parts of the matrix, which then
ripple further out. This concept of how ideas interact within their matrix through a sort of
ripple effect is a major point made by Hacking.
Now that we have laid the foundational points needed, let us discuss some of the
big arguments made by Hacking that will be useful for political science. The first
argument we will examine is that there exists a fundamental difference between the way
in which objects and ideas interact within the social and natural sciences. Hacking argues
that the underlying difference between the domains of the natural and social sciences lies
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in the way our ideas or classifications, which is just a specific type of idea, interact with
the object being studied. In the natural sciences, our ideas or classifications don't have an
impact on the object being studied, gravity, plants, and chemical bonds don't care about
how we understand them because they don't know nor can they. Because of this Hacking
argues that the natural sciences are comprised of indifferent kinds of objects, in that these
objects don’t have an explicit interaction with the idea or classification they are given.
However, the ideas and classifications of the social sciences do interact with our object of
study, a person, a group of people, and the leaders of nation-states are capable of learning
about our ideas and classifications of them and thus interact with our ideas and
classifications. Hacking states that the social sciences are comprised of interactive kinds
of objects because they are capable of understanding and interacting with the idea or
classification of themselves. For example, if a nation-state is labeled a democracy by the
political science community the leaders of the nation-state and the people in it can know
this, and this may impact their behavior.
This distinction between interactive and indifferent kinds is extremely important
because not only is the domain of the social sciences unique in the way their ideas or
classifications and objects interact, but also what happens after this interaction. If a
political party knows that they are labeled in a specific way by political scientists, think
tanks, etc. this may have an impact on their behavior, this is in the initial interaction. But
after the party changes their behavior, they may now need to be reclassified as a different
political ideology, party, etc., this is where the object now forces a change in its
classification, in a sense it creates a sort of feedback loop. This feedback loop is unique to
the social sciences, as Hacking himself states, “The fundamental idea is almost too
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simple-minded. People are self-conscious. They are capable of self-knowledge. They are
potential moral agents for whom autonomy has been, since the days of Rousseau and
Kant, a central Western value. Quarks and tripeptides are not moral agents and there is no
looping effect for quarks (Hacking 2001).” This looping effect is present everywhere we
look within the social sciences, and there are plenty of examples we can pull from
political science as well.
To demonstrate an example of how this feedback loop can occur in the realm of
political science let us build out a thought experiment. Let us position ourselves as a
world leader of a democratic state who is coming off of a not-so-good year. This has
caused the different political scientists, think tanks, organizations, etc. to list our country
as currently being at a lower level of democracy than we were last year which might be
an indication of democratic backsliding. Now let us stop here and ask a few questions.
When these data sets are released who has access to them? Nearly everyone, the leaders
of the state have access to them, researchers in and out of the state have access to them,
and civilians inside and outside the state have access to them. Now not everyone will care
nor even necessarily understand what this means, however, this data could also be
presented to them through news media in a way that then makes them care. All of this is
to say that when these different groups put out their report it sends out a massive ripple
throughout the matrix of not only the state we are in but also the international system.
This could cause the state to lose legitimacy within the eyes of the public and cause civil
unrest which could lead to more democratic backsliding. Perhaps this slip in the rankings
causes the international system to engage in sanctions against the state further causing
internal issues. Or even let us assume a more optimistic outcome and the state recognizes
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its failures and works to fix them so as to go up in the rankings again. But they could also
try to game the system due to their knowledge of what is specifically being looked at.
Would it be fair to say that any one of these outcomes, plus the many more we could
conceive, come about due to the reclassification of the state? One would be hard-pressed
to say that the reclassification didn't have at least some degree of impact on the events
that take place, thus we must accept the looping effect in our thought experiment at least
to some degree.
While the existence of the looping effect in the thought experiment doesn’t prove
that it happens in every part of political science, it should at least give even the most
cynical readers slight pause. If this effect only takes place in a few areas throughout
political science, it is still something we have not accounted for in those areas because we
are still utilizing methods and beliefs that are based on an entirely different kind of
classification. Beyond that, this would be assuming we could even know which areas are
in fact undergoing this kind of feedback loop because without a proper mindset change
the loop may not be visible at first glance and require a thorough analysis to see. This
serves to give more credence to the main point of this paper which is that while there has
been much work done in the philosophy of science and social science there is no space
within our community to properly examine and engage with them because we don’t have
our own sub-field. There is no institutional importance in these affairs, yet it is only
political scientists who can engage in discussions of our foundational paradigm, thus we
must open a space for them to happen.
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The Goals of Political Science
The final critique that I will levy against the current tacit philosophy of political
science comes down to the overall goal of political science as a scientific tradition.
While, yes, there is the very basic goal of expanding our understanding of the world
around us, this is not a very useful goal to work off for even astrologers hope to achieve
the same goal. When I speak of the goal of political science as a scientific tradition what I
mean is something more specific that asks what is it that we as a community of scientists
seek to do? To answer this question, we must take a look back again at the literature that
was drawn on earlier in this chapter, and when we do we will notice there does in fact
seem to be some sort of consensus on this topic, though it is not usually explicitly stated.
In various political science textbooks, we can see that there are two main traditions,
puzzle and problem-solving, which I will discuss in more detail later in this section. As
such I would argue that our current foundational paradigm holds the goals of our
scientific tradition to be either to solve puzzles or problems. Yet, just as there were
misunderstandings and alternative views within the tacit understanding of our
foundational paradigm of things like the natural sciences and categorization, there are just
as many problems and potential perspectives here that we must examine. These
discussions are done to show the importance of critically evaluating our goals because
they shape the things we care about and investigate as political scientists. These
discussions are needed, but they will only happen if we create a space where they can
exist and be seen, as such we need institutional recognition of these investigations. This
section will start by offering some evidence to the initial claim, then I will demonstrate
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the issues that come with the puzzle and problem-solving traditions. Finally, I will
examine work done in the field of education to bring forward an alternative path.
When it comes to offering up evidence for the claim that I presented, we must
remember that this task is going to be a hard one because of our tacit beliefs. While this
may be the case, there are some clear examples in various textbooks. In McNabb (2004),
Nau (2017), O’Neil, Fields, and Share (2015), and Clark, Golder, and Golder (2019) we
can see a clear view that our goal is that of either puzzle or problem-solving. However,
not many of these textbooks will outright claim that our goal is either to solve puzzles or
problems. While not all of them use the terms puzzle or problem-solving the way they
position the research conducted by political scientists makes a very clear implication that
this is the goal. Beyond that, the desire to generate causal claims that exist in our tacit
philosophy is also very useful for solving problems because understanding why
something happened is often essential in fixing it. Thus, I would also argue that there are
many different parts of our tacit belief system that also reinforce this view of what the
goals of our scientific tradition ought to be.
Now that I have given some evidence to the claim that political science is a
problem and or puzzle-solving tradition, let us examine what this means and what the
problems are when political science uses one or the other. Fundamentally puzzles and
problems are different, though they are not mutually exclusive for a puzzle can be a
problem, but it doesn't have to be, the same is true vis versa. Because of this fundamental
difference, we should split them in two and approach them separately. Let us start by
looking at the puzzle-solving tradition, and to start let us ask ourselves, what is a puzzle?
While we know that they are different from problems, this doesn’t tell us what they are.
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Puzzles are situations or games that have clear rules which govern how they are played
and outline how winning and losing operate. Winning in a puzzle ultimately means that
the person has come to a correct answer while losing means coming across an incorrect
answer. A good way to explain it is through a metaphor and let us go ahead and use the
game of sudoku. In sudoku, there are a clear set of parameters that one must follow in
order to arrive at the correct solution to any sudoku puzzle. These parameters are that the
numbers 1-9 must appear in each row, column, and square, but no number is allowed to
be repeated in any row, column, or square. These rules are quite explicit, and it also
means that we not only know when a solution has been arrived at, but it also clearly tells
us when we are wrong as well. Yet, political science doesn’t have a set of codified rules
that are strict in this way, this means that we aren’t able to tell when a puzzle is solved or
if we have simply found a wrong answer. This inability to declare when one fails also
makes it harder for us to know what to keep when we decide a failure has occurred, do
we throw out the arguments, methods, beliefs, etc. of the individual researcher or the
theory being tested (Kuhn 1979)?
All of these issues now raise a new and interesting question, does political science
actually have the capacity to properly solve a puzzle? I have two different answers to this
question, one is cut and dry, while the other is more ambiguous. The cut and dry answer
to the question is simply no, political science doesn’t have a framework it can utilize to
solve a puzzle, nor are there even puzzles to be solved in political science. This is, once
again, a consequence of our tacit understanding of our foundational paradigm, without
having any codified rules in place one cannot go about solving a puzzle. Returning to our
sudoku metaphor, imagine playing a new game of sudoku where there is still only one
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answer but now the rules are gone, what do we do? Well, we could brute force our way to
try to find an answer, except no, we can't do that because our lack of rules also means we
don't know when we are wrong. Thus, our tacit philosophy ends up being the greatest
hindrance to our ability to act as a puzzle-solving tradition. The other answer to this
question moves away from black and white distinctions between what is and isn't a
puzzle and allows for more non-traditional puzzles to exist. We could say that while
political science can’t solve formal and traditional puzzles, it can solve things like
practical puzzles, which may not have as clear-cut rules as formal puzzles. This idea
positions our answer in a shade of grey, sure they aren't the same puzzles we are used to,
but it's still a puzzle. Regardless of which argument one chooses the overall point is still
the same, we can't say our goals are to solve puzzles in the traditional sense, and thus, it
would be better to reclassify this goal.
Now having gone over the idea of what a puzzle-solving tradition is let us
examine the other tradition, problem-solving. First let us address the question of what, in
a very general sense, is a problem-solving tradition? A problem-solving tradition focuses
on understanding the causes of a problem and then finding a solution to said problem.
However, just like a puzzle, there must be some semblance of a rule set in place to state
things like how we can tell when a problem is solved. But before one could even begin to
solve a problem one must first outline what exactly a problem is. A simple answer is that
a problem exists when a gap is opened between the way the world ought to work and the
way it works. Thus, while puzzle and problem-solving traditions are similar in some
ways, they differ in other aspects such as their criterion of evaluation and so on.
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The biggest issue with the idea of political science being a problem-solving
science can be seen when we reexamine the definition of a problem that was just given. A
problem is simply a situation in which our explanations of how the world ought to work
run into conflict with how the world does work, but why does this become an issue for
us? One major reason is that a problem only exists when one has a view of how the world
ought to work. This may be fine for engineers but is it ok for political science to even say
how the world ought to operate? For example, there is a consistent discussion in political
science about why states don't simply become democracies because that is simply the
goal they ought to strive towards. Yet this problem only exists if someone thinks that
states ought to move towards being democracies. Fundamentally the problems that we
pose in political science are not the same as the problems in the natural sciences. The
problems posed in political science are value-laden and are in no way objective, they
reflect the beliefs and views of the community and the individual scientists of how the
world ought to operate. The second issue with a problem-solving tradition is that it is
more useful for engineering and not science. Engineers attempt to fix the problems that
exist within the world by bridging the gap between expectations and reality. But we are
not engineers, we are scientists, we don't fix the gaps between our ideas of how the world
ought to work and how it actually does, we are supposed to uncover how the world
works. Because of this, I would argue that we ought to stop saying, in any way, that our
science is one that attempts to solve, what are ultimately, subjective problems because
that would make us not scientists but engineers.
With both of the main traditions now having been examined and critiqued, let us
now examine what an alternative could be to these traditions, the idea of problem-posing.
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This idea is one that I am sure might be foreign to some political scientists for the idea
doesn't come from any science or even formal philosophy, but educational studies.
Because of this, I want to take some time and examine the original concept. The original
idea comes from the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire’s book Pedagogy of the Oppressed
(1970). In this book, Freire outlines what a problem-posing education looks like, why it is
useful, and what the unique benefits are. Freire originally wrote Pedagogy because of his
experiences working as an educator in Brazil and being involved in literacy programs
aimed at the ‘peasant’ laborers. Through these experiences, he began to notice that the
current form of education, what he refers to as the banking model of education, was
highly insufficient at lifting people up and was more useful in maintaining systems of
power and domination. This is because this model tells students that they virtually know
nothing, they are in class to be given information. Students are not encouraged to
critically evaluate the information being presented to them because they are seen as being
unable to. The banking model tells both students and teachers that students are not ready
to think for themselves, they are helpless and must be taken care of. As such, students go
through school and are met with dehumanization and domination as their views are
disregarded and their experiences are devalued.
After recognizing these issues Freire sought to devise a pedagogy, or an
educational method, that would allow oppressed peoples to recognize the causes of their
own oppression, recognize how the society around them supports this oppression, and
how they might be able to find a solution. With this goal in mind, he ended up crafting
the problem-posing pedagogy to fight back against the issues he found in the banking
model. Problem-posing education focuses on building a level of critical consciousness in
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oppressed peoples. Critical consciousness, for Freire, is a form of consciousness that
allows oppressed peoples to recognize the different causes of said oppression. This model
does this by building a different type of relationship between teachers, students, and the
world around them. This pedagogy approaches students as though they are not simply
dumb, but that they have their own experiences and ideas which should be valued,
listened to, and examined. Teachers are also repositioned in this pedagogy as not being
monolithic figures of knowledge that are there to regurgitate this knowledge, but as
fellow learners and partners with students. Thus, in this pedagogy teachers accept that
they can learn from their students and grow just as students can. This, in turn, empowers
both the teacher and the students allowing them to critically evaluate the topics they are
discussing and helping to show both parties that the world is not static but changing.
While the contemporary form of problem-posing traditions is situated mostly
within education, I would like to expand this tradition outward and demonstrate how it
can be applied to political science. Now adopting this model is hard because education
and political science are quite different, yet I think this endeavor is worth engaging in. I
argue that there are two main reasons why adopting this model can be helpful for political
science, the first looks at the history of natural science, specifically physics. For a long
time, Newtonian physics reigned supreme, until Einstein came along and completely
changed how physics saw the cosmos. But how did this transition from Newtonian
physics to relativity occur? This is a big question, and there is no one answer, but the one
that I think many would agree with is that before relativity became a theory, scientists
were hard at work poking holes in Newtonian physics. For years scientists constantly
pushed Newtonian physics as far as it could go, this is similar to the idea put forward by
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Popper, which states that scientists ought to push theories to their breaking points. This
meant that eventually, cracks began to form within the approach that called for changes
and thus helped give rise to relativity. By cracks, I mean issues, little things that start to
not make sense as we learn more. In Newtonian physics, it was certain planetary motions
that the model was unable to account for. But it wasn't a series of issues, or cracks, that
led to its abolition, it took massive holes in the model that forced individuals like Einstein
to have to completely reconceptualize the world around us and move away from it. A
problem-posing tradition of science does not seek to answer questions, problems, or
puzzles, instead, it seeks to examine the world as is, or our current understanding of the
world, and home in on a part of it and ask questions about it. This is also different than
simply pushing a theory as far as one can because this idea is useful for sciences that
engage in lab testing where one can push a theory. But in political science we can't truly
test our ideas, we are more forced into either finding historical evidence for our theories,
looking for contemporary evidence or simply waiting and seeing if the theory is right.
The questions that would be asked by a problem-posing tradition are more in-depth than
the ones asked and answered by a problem or puzzle-solving tradition because the goal of
having an answer is never present.
The second reason why we ought to adopt Freire's approach, in some way, is that
this method is one of the only potential solutions we have to the problem of feedback
loops. Not only is our current western educational style still modeled on the banking
model, but this in turn causes us to see people as inherently dumb unless proven
otherwise. When we ask questions such as, 'why don't people do things that will benefit
their own self-interest' we engage in a form of mockery. This idea insinuates that people
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don't know their own self-interest and that it is only us, the scientists, who truly
understand what it is that will make their lives better. Yet this just means that we end up
ignoring people and thinking less of them, either actively or passively. However, in a
problem-posing tradition we wouldn't approach people as being, misguided, dumb, etc.
we approach them as individuals with valid views, beliefs, experiences, etc. This
approach allows us to recognize that individuals have an impact on the society around
them and that they are autonomous individuals who will have varied beliefs and ideas.
We wouldn't clump people together under things like the statistical ‘norm’ because this
idea means nothing for us, people are people.
To say that political science ought to engage in one specific tradition or another is
to make a bold claim. It is to say that the person asserting the claim knows that the path
forward is one that can only be taken by those who utilize the specific tradition and that
all others will falter. Yet how can anyone person be sure about the path that any science
takes? It is important that we expand our view of what we are as a scientific tradition
because our current limited view stifles our ability. If we only see certain things as being
important, such as puzzles or problems, then we miss examining the rest of the world. We
end up blinding ourselves to other ways of viewing and interacting with the world around
us. If we wish to say we are a science then we must work with the world and try to
understand it, not plant our feet and tell the world to move in accordance with our views.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION
To conclude this project, I want to offer some final thoughts about the potential
benefits that can be derived within our field from the creation of the philosophy of
political science. The main benefit I want to address is the potential for growth within our
field by better understanding our foundational paradigm. I have shown throughout this
thesis that political scientists often don’t fully understand the foundational paradigm of
our science. This stems from how we teach our science and the various sub-fields that
currently comprise it. A philosophy of political science can help us find a better way to
educate newer students to help them have a better grasp of our foundational paradigm.
This will also help working political scientists now as well. To help demonstrate the
point, I want to offer a bit of speculation about what the changes to our field might look
like should the philosophy of political science come into existence. I have chosen to
speculate about these changes by examining a contemporary textbook and then
discussing a few modifications to its overall structure. The textbook I have chosen to
discuss is Clark, Golder, and Golder (2019). I have chosen this textbook because of both
how new it is, and the content within it. While this textbook mostly covers comparative
political science, it spends its first section discussing science and politics in general and it
is here where I will focus. This section is also where the authors lay out their
foundational paradigm of political science and science in general. I will start by going
over their first section in more detail before offering my changes.
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The first section of Clark, Golder, and Golder (2019) is titled simply, “What is
Comparative Politics?” and it is broken down into three chapters. The first chapter is a
very basic introductory discussion that starts by giving an overview of the rest of the
textbook. After this is done the authors then give their reasons for why they discuss the
topic of comparative political science in the way they do and outline the benefits they
believe are gained through their approach. The next chapter is aptly titled “What is
Science?”, and it is here that the authors examine the concept of science. More
specifically they start by asking the same question as the chapter title. They argue that
science is but one answer to the question of epistemology and is ultimately a pursuit for a
particular form of knowledge. They then go on to discuss logic and concepts such as
valid and invalid arguments. Next, the authors discuss what they see as being myths
about science. The first myth is that science can reach objective truths, the second is that
scientific knowledge is only possible when experimentation is possible, third is that
scientists are value-neutral, and the final myth is that politics can’t be scientifically
examined. 9 The third chapter is titled “What is Politics” and simply offers the authors’
perspective about what politics is. This chapter is odd because it offers only one singular
view of politics, that being a theory based on the work of Albert Hirschman which they
refer to as the exit, voice, and loyalty (EVL) theory of politics (Hirschman 1970). The
discussion in this chapter is entirely around this one theory and what insights it can
provide.

These myths are very interesting for the simple fact that it simply clouds my own understanding of what
the authors foundational paradigm truly is. While it seems initially simple, they cloud this simplicity by
arguing that scientists aren’t value neutral. Ultimately, I think that the cloudiness created by their views is
more reflective of the greater issue this thesis brings up, that being that the understanding of the own
foundational paradigm of political science is tacit.

9
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Having gone over what the layout of Clark, Golder, and Golder (2019) is, let us
now examine the changes to this layout that I argue are reflective of some of the
meaningful changes that might occur within our field. The first chapter is an introductory
chapter and I think that the layout utilized by Clark, Golder, and Golder works well. I do
want to point out one thing about this chapter I do like, the section devoted to explaining
why they are taking a different approach to teach the sub-field the way they do. In this
section, they also offer some very good arguments as to why they take this approach, and
it is a demonstration of self-reflection as the authors recognize the existence of the other
ways to teach this sub-field. As such I don’t think any changes are needed at all.
While I wouldn’t change much about the first chapter, the same cannot be said for
the second one. To start, I would make some big changes to the section, “what is
science?”. I argue that this section would be better if it started this topic off by engaging
in a quick historical discussion of science and its roots to help show the long history of
science that we often forget. This historical discussion can be followed by an examination
of both the philosophy of science and different views about how science advances. This
three-part discussion would be better suited to showing the changes in science over time,
the different approaches we have currently to explaining why these changes occur and
introduce students to the field of study that asks questions like the one asked by the
section heading. The next change to this chapter would be in the section about the
scientific method. In this section I would discuss the very concept of a unified method of
science, why we use it, and what some of the potential downsides might be. This idea
seems silly at first, but in reality, it is a fair thing to discuss. Why should we care more
about the similarities between the methods of the physicist and the economist, than their
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differences? This discussion will allow students to better understand the concepts that are
contained within the idea of a unified method better than simply going over a cookiecutter outline. Another benefit to this discussion is that it would help formalize a bit of
the tacit understanding we have of the scientific method in our community. The next
section I would change in this chapter is the final part where the author talks about some
supposed ‘myths’ of science. While I do agree with some of the larger points presented in
this section, I don’t think it is helpful to refer to these views as simply myths. I would
change this section to offer some counterpoints of view about science and the topics
discussed in the chapter that were not brought up. This section could discuss different
views of epistemology that were held by scientists in the past but that were abandoned
later after a new discovery. This would help to show that science is an ever-changing
concept, the views held today are not guaranteed to be the ones science holds tomorrow.
Having gone over the chapter about science, let us now examine the changes I
think should be done for the next chapter, “What is Politics?” Overall, I think this section
can be improved by first condensing the discussion the authors have about their theory.
This isn’t to say that their theory is bad, nor that it is good, but that it is only one view
and thus must be treated as such. After the authors present their theory and give a case for
it, then we can add a section devoted to examining other views about politics. This would
help to show the wide array of different views about what politics is as a concept. The
reason that this is important is that politics is our domain, and while it is helpful for
individuals to have their own views about what this domain is, we shouldn’t only present
one view to students. Students ought to understand the other views in our field as this
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helps with increasing their capacity for critical thinking as they are forced to examine
different views and the benefits and disadvantages each holds.
Now that I have gone over the main chapters I want to now present the biggest
change I would make to the layout of this textbook, which is to add a whole new chapter,
titled, What is Political Science? I believe this chapter is needed to help bridge the gap
between the two previous chapters. Not only that but there ought to be more of a
discussion about what our science is, as currently the authors just describe it as the
scientific study of politics. I would start this new chapter off with a brief history of our
science. This could mean covering individuals such as Aristotle, Plato, Machiavelli, and
other political philosophers who would give rise to our field. It could also examine some
of the main thinkers who were vital to the establishment of our field, such as Comte,
Durkheim, and Weber. From here I would then add a section discussing the philosophy of
political science. Since the philosophy of political science would be the philosophical
investigation of political science, I would argue that this section would simply aim to
show the importance of these investigations and what can come from them. Some
examples of the things this section could cover are, examining the role of values in
political science, discussing the different methods used in political science as well as the
specific sub-field being approached in the textbook, and the ties between the methods of
the natural sciences and ours. By adding this section, we can help students see why they
should interrogate their understanding of what science is and how to do it. The final
section I would add to this new chapter would be all about what our foundational
paradigm is. This section would cover what the underlying foundational paradigm is for
political science, as well as the specific foundational paradigm(s) for the sub-field being
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discussed. I believe that this final discussion helps to also bring the various things
discussed in the chapter together as students would be better able to understand what they
are doing, a bit of the history about what they are doing, and most importantly, why they
are doing what they are.
While these changes are just speculation about how the philosophy of political
science could impact our field, I believe that they demonstrate the point that there is a lot
of work to be done and that there is potential. We must be more willing to critically selfreflect and examine our own ideas, beliefs, values, etc. because that is how we can grow
as a science. It is also important that we impart this necessity onto students as well. The
philosophy of political science would allow for new ideas to come into existence, old
ones to try to potentially reclaim their former glory, and current ideas to stand their
ground against these assaults. In short, I believe that this sub-field’s creation will have a
massive impact on the community, and it would help propel our science to a whole new
height.
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Footnotes
1

See the sub-section, misunderstanding the natural sciences and the philosophy of

science, for more information.
2

The only real piece of criticism one can find about this is done by Fukuyama

himself in another one of his books, Our Posthuman Future (2002). In this second book,
Fukuyama retracts the claim that history has ended because for this to happen modern
science and technology would also have to come to an end.
3

Further on in this section I discuss his views in more detail and offer up evidence

for this claim.
4

This question is not designed to demonize metaphysics but to show that his

views are but one more metaphysical view in a see of alternatives. This is because if we
can find no real empirical evidence for his claim then it must resort to using metaphysical
claims to justify itself.
5

It should be noted that the argument that the scientific method doesn’t exist isn’t

a new one, it is one advocated by many philosophers of science and scientists, which I
bring up not to show the validity of the overall argument, but to demonstrate that there is
indeed a debate within the community, one that has largely ignored (Feyerabend
2010)(Kuhn 2012)(Bridgman 1955).
6

I would note that I do accept the metaphysical nature of the claim made. The

statement is not made in the hopes of appearing metaphysically neutral but to show that
there is no non-metaphysical answer to the question of whether scientific knowledge is
objective or not.
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7

While it is not relevant to the discussion here, I would note that it is most likely

the case that all living things create categories and classifications. However, humans do it
in a very conscious, and some might say compulsive, manner.
8

I would argue that regardless of one's personal view about whether the world

and meaning come first or if humans come first and then build the world and meaning,
this point still stands. If the world and meaning come first then humans are simply
discovering the world as is and thus our categories and classifications are still a way to
make sense of, what appears at first, as a chaotic world. If humans come first then our
categories and classifications are built by us to help us understand the world.
9

These myths are very interesting for the simple fact that it simply clouds my own

understanding of what the authors foundational paradigm truly is. While it seems initially
simple, they cloud this simplicity by arguing that scientists aren’t value neutral.
Ultimately, I think that the cloudiness created by their views is more reflective of the
greater issue this thesis brings up, that being that the understanding of the own
foundational paradigm of political science is tacit.

